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Abstract. This study addresses the post-financial crisis EU banking regulation reform CRD IV. The specific focus is on 
the relationship between increased capital requirements and the subsequent change in both supply and the price of 
bank credit. This study employs a twofold data consisting of a panel of Finnish unlisted savings and cooperative banks’ 
key figures over the period 2002-2018 and a representative survey conducted with personnel of Finnish institutions. In 
addition to the consistent finding in regards to the effect of bank profitability as well as fairly consistent findings in 
regards to the effect of bank size and GDP growth, the key finding suggests a slight decrease in loan supply under the 
CRD IV.  
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The somewhat informal group of regulators and central bankers that had been collaborating 
prior to the 2008 financial crisis, became more formal after the establishment of the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) in 2009. The FSB was handed the responsibility to coordinate the work at 
the international level and together with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
they prepared the first draft of the Basel III Rules. The draft was first endorsed by the Group of 
20 in November 2010 and then finalized later in December (Howarth & Quaglia, 2016; Walker, 
2011). Basel III effectively imposes minimum standards for capital requirements, supervision 
and market discipline in order to provide “a foundation for a resilient banking system that will 
help avoid the build-up of systemic vulnerabilities”. (Bank of International Settlements, 2017).  
The European Union has participated in and advocated the regulatory reform. In 
consequence, the EU implemented the Basel III framework into the EU legislation through 
Capital Requirements Directive 2013/36/EU and the Capital Requirements Regulation (EU) 
No 575/2013. Together they form a regulatory package known as CRD IV, which replaced the 
former directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. The provisions have applied to institutions since 
1 January 2014, though the scheduled implementation phase-in period extends to 2019. As 
Basel III rules are, in essence, internationally-agreed industry standards, they rather provide a 
basis on which the EU is building its own regulatory and supervisory infrastructure. Through 
Single Rulebook, the EU seeks to facilitate banking sector consolidation, increase transparency 
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and enhance cross-border activity in order to expand financing capabilities and reduce 
intermediation costs. The European Commission (2016) has depicted deeper integration to be a 
necessary action to restore market confidence and solve those shortcomings that were first 
exposed by the financial crisis and then by the subsequent euro area debt problem.  
Meanwhile, the EC (2016) has also urged that stability should not come with the price of 
economic stagnation. Instead, the regulatory objectives need to be achieved in a way that is 
fully supportive of the ongoing recovery in the EU. The EC further noted that despite 
technological disruption within the lending business, banks continue to act as the key source of 
funding for businesses and households. For banks to serve this function, the regulatory 
environment should in a proportionate manner consider banks' complexity, size, business profile 
and specificities. In accordance, the purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of the 
renewed EU capital requirements on bank lending in the context of the Finnish banking sector. 
The empirical strategy relies on a twofold data, and the specific aim of this study is provided by 
the following research problems: 
1. The relationship between increased capital requirements and the corresponding change in 
credit supply.  
2. The relationship between increased capital requirements and the corresponding change in 
price of credit. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next chapter introduces the main elements of capital 
requirements under the CRD IV regulation. Datasets and methods are described in more detail 
in chapter 3. Results are reported and discussed in chapter 4, after which the paper is 
concluded in chapter 5.   
 
2.  The EU capital rules revisited  
CRD IV imposes general requirements regarding the quality and the minimum level of capital. 
As reflected by Table 1, the qualitative approach allocates capital into different layers in order to 
reflect differences in sustainability, liquidity and predictability between different asset classes. 
Consequently, the two main components are Tier 1 and Tier 2. The preferred component Tier 1 
is further divided into Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) and an Additional Tier 1 (AT1). The 
mandatory capital components are supplemented with macroprudential capital buffers, whose 
implementation depends on certain institution and market environment-related factors. 
The second element of the capital framework constitutes of liquidity regulation. The 
importance was emphasized by the financial crisis during which the acute problem at first was 
not the insufficient amount of capital, but the increasing uncertainty, which forced banks to 
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Table 1. A review of the CRD IV capital rules. 




Eligible Capital  
    
CET1 4,5 % Cash, common shares issued by the bank, retained 
earnings, other comprehensive income and reserves 
 
AT1 1,5 % Perpetual paid-up capital instruments and their 
associated share premium accounts. Assets shall not be 
purchased by the institution nor be subject to any 
arrangement that enhances the seniority of the claim by 
the institution or under the instruments in insolvency or 
liquidation 
 
Tier 1 6 %   
Tier 2  2 % Capital instruments and subordinated loans and share 
premium accounts. Tier 2 instruments are issued, or the 
subordinated loans are raised and fully paid-up, but not 
purchased nor funded either directly or indirectly by the 
institution. The claim must be wholly subordinated to the 
claims of all non-subordinated creditors, and should not 
be secured or subject to a guarantee that enhances the 
seniority of its claim 
 
Total 8 %   
Additional Capital Buffers    
Capital Conservation Buffer 2,5 % CET1 Capital  
Countercyclical Capital Buffer*   0-2,5 % CET1 Capital  
G-SII Buffer** 1-3,5 % CET1 Capital  
O-SII Buffer*** 0-2 % CET1 Capital  
Systemic Risk Buffer**** 0-5 % CET1 Capital  
    
Notes. *Implemented by National Authority based on (excessive) aggregate credit growth, **Mandatory buffer for banks 
that are identified by the relevant authority as globally systemically important institutions, ***Optional buffer on “other” 
systemically important institutions: either domestically important or EU important institutions, ****Member State may 
introduce a Systemic Risk Buffer for the sector or one or more subsets of the sector, in order to prevent and mitigate 
systemic or macro-prudential risks. The buffer may exceed 5 % should circumstances call for it. 
 
As a result, banks found themselves unable to honor their obligations in frozen interbank 
markets. In order to cope with the situation, banks engaged in coincidental fire sales of non-
liquid assets, which generated a steep fall in asset prices (Aldasoro et al., 2017; Berrospide, 
2013). To address the witnessed shortfalls, the EU adopted two specific measures to 
correspond with the Basel work. First, BSCS introduced Liquidity Coverage Ratio, which aims to 
provide protection against severe short-term liquidity shocks. Accordingly, banks are now 
required to hold High Quality Liquidity Assets1 (“HQLA”) against anticipated net outgoing cash 
flows over a 30-day severe stress period. The ratio shall equal to or exceed 100 % in any given 
                                                    
1 The category HQLA includes assets that enjoy sufficient trading volume, low volatility, transparent 
pricing and post-trade information, and are not correlated with high-risk asset classes. 
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time. The second tool, Net Stable Funding Ratio, has a time horizon of one year. As banks are 
exposed to funding liquidity risk arising from their funding structures and the maturity mismatch 
in their balance sheet, NSFR targets to secure a more sustainable long-term maturity structure 
of assets and liabilities (Gobat et al., 2014). The NSFR is calculated as a ratio of available 
stable funding (ASF) against the amount of required stable funding (RSF). The ASF is defined 
as the portion of capital and liabilities expected to be reliable over the target time horizon. The 
amount of RSF is a function of liquidity characteristics and residual maturities of the various 
assets held by the institution.  
Thirdly, the BCBS introduced a completely new non-risk based leverage constraint to 
complement the remaining risk-based capital framework. BCBS (2014) concluded that the 
underlying cause for the meltdown had been the build-up of excessive on- and off-balance 
sheet leverage in the banking system. Following the adoption, the binding 3 % Leverage Ratio 
(LR) became fully applicable in the EU in January 2018. In accordance with the BCBS proposal, 
LR is calculated as the amount of CET1 capital against bank’s all non-risk weighted assets. 
Indeed, this contradicts other capital provisions, as LR does not consider any risk weights or 
risk models. Furthermore, banks are expected to meet the requirement in addition to their risk-
based capital requirements. 
 
3. Data and methods 
3.1.  Key financial figures  
We estimate the effect of several bank-specific and macroeconomic factors on banks’ annual 
loan growth by employing a panel data of Finnish unlisted savings and cooperative banks’ key 
figures over the period 2002-2018. The specific interest is on the regulation dummy variable 
“CRD IV”, which takes on the value of 0 for period 2002-2013 and 1 otherwise. Although CRD 
IV is an encompassing regulation, this study applies it solely as a proxy for “increased capital 
requirements”. The dependent variable “Loan growth” is the annual logarithmic change of 
banks’ total loans to the public (excluding loans to other institutions). Hence, the econometric 
part of this study is solely focused on the first research problem.  
While the macroeconomic data was retrieved from Statistics Finland (Tilastokeskus), the 
bank key figure data was obtained from the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority’s 
(Finanssivalvonta) website. In total, 339 unique bank identifiers exist in the dataset, though only 
188 of them are identified and measured each year (17 times). Hence, while 38 savings banks 
and 279 cooperative banks existed in 2002, the corresponding numbers in 2018 totaled at “just” 
23 and 182 banks, respectively. Namely, the change in individual bank’s status occurs in two 
primary ways: either the bank is acquired by another bank, which absorbs the business and 
proceeds as a larger entity, or it joins a merger of equals, where a new bank is established after 
two or more banks come together and cease to exist as separate, independent entities. A 
dummy variable “Consolidation” is used to control acquiring bank’s consolidated figures in order 
to avoid spurious jumps following the acquisition.  




Table 2. Variables and descriptive statistics.   
 Obs. Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max Description 
       
Dependent variable       
Loan growth 4,361 .06788 .08083 -.2653 1.7481 Annual change in bank 
lending 
Independent variables       
Consolidation    0 1 A dummy to capture 
jumps in acquiring 
bank’s figures after an 
absorption 
CRD IV    0 1 Bank regulation 
dummy: 0 = 2002-
2013, 1 = 2014-2018 
GDP growth rate 4,700 1.3530 3.0626 -8.3 5.2 Annual percentage 
change 
Interest rate 4,700 1.6300 1.5540 -.329 4.644 3 month Euribor, 
annual average of the 
daily values 
Household indebtedness 4,700 106.98 17.157 72.1 128.6 Annual 
Total assets 4,700 198494.7 421470.7 4008 1.01e+07 A proxy for size 
Off-balance sheet 
items/assets 
4,700 4.7969 2.1002 .31371 18.258 A proxy for off-balance 
sheet activity, % of 
total assets 
Equity/assets 4,700 12.088 4.2965 .33770 29.742 Equity capital, % of 
total assets 
Return on assets 4,698 1.0753 .6413 -
5.1868 
6.5713 Operating income 
(pre-tax), % of total 
assets 
Cost/income ratio 4,700 63.108 15.814 10.405 518.8 A proxy for efficiency 
 
 
      
Note. The descriptive statistics do not take into account the panel data structure. That is, the means and standard 
deviations have been calculated across all banks in all years. 
 
Table 2 presents the variables and descriptive statistics. 
We estimate the following baseline model: 
 
𝛥𝑦 𝛼 𝑿′ , 𝛽 𝑿′ 𝛾 𝑾′ 𝜁 𝜇  [1] 
  
where 𝑿s include the once-lagged bank-specific and macroeconomic explanatory variables, 𝑾 
is the set of dummy variables and 𝜇 is the error term. All bank-specific variables are in natural 
logarithms.  
 




The second part of the study tackles both research problems. The data is based on the relevant 
parts of a bank survey conducted in 2016 with personnel of Finnish institutions. Respondents 
included business area directors, risk officers and in one case, a chief executive officer. They 
represented commercial, cooperative and savings banks as well as one credit institution. Three 
bank groups are involved in both datasets.   
The survey consists of four thematic parts and a total of 27 individual items. First, the 
respondents were asked to examine the change in loan terms for different lending scenarios. 
This study interprets the expression “loan term” as a proxy for loan supply. Further, the second 
and third question sets considered changes in both supply and the price of credit. Lastly, the 
respondents were asked to assess the importance of different factors on the recent 
development of their profitability.  
Although the survey is near fully representative of the Finnish banking sector in terms of 
aggregate capital and market value, the small N (= 7) provides the analysis is entirely 
qualitative. Secondly, respondents’ answers shall not be considered an accurate and objective 
reflection of the banks’ actual strategic behavior. Rather, the answers are suggested to reflect 
personal, subjective views on issues brought up in the survey. Thus, the paper only reports 
descriptive statistics, including the median, mode and the range of the numerical values 
assigned to different answer options. Results are discussed together with and analyzed against 
the findings from prior studies.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Key financial figures 
At first, a naïve pooled OLS estimator is employed. Results are reported in Table 3. Since the 
acquisition of another bank is expected to increase the value of acquirer’s loan portfolio, it is 
fairly unsurprising that the dummy variable Consolidation enters positive and statistically highly 
significant in each specification. Interestingly though, the results suggest a negative relationship 
between bank size (proxied by total assets) and loan growth. The regulation dummy CRD IV 
enters negative and statistically significant, suggesting a decrease in bank lending under the 
renewed regulatory environment. Although this result does not necessarily contradict the 
European Central Bank (2016), it is nevertheless noteworthy that the ECB noted a shift among 
euro area banks from investment banking, wholesale lending and lending in higher-risk sectors 










Table 3. OLS estimations. 
 I II III IV V 
      
Consolidation .07202*** .07342*** .08054*** .08017*** .07999*** 
 (.01405) (.01400) (.01423) (.01413) (.01432) 
CRD IV -.04720*** -.0355*** -.01289** -.00802 -.01415** 
 (.00297) (.00387) (.00443) (.00458) (.00510) 
GDP growth rate, t-1  .00193*** .00098** .00083* .00073* 
  (.00034) (.00034) (.00034) (.00035) 
Interest rate, t-1  .00410*** .00176 .00221* -.00048 
  (.00101) (.00101) (.00101) (.00118) 
Household indebtedness, t-1   -.0012*** -.0012*** -.00107*** 
   (.00008) (.00008) (.00009) 
Total assets, t-1   -.00081 -.00478** -.00633*** 
   (.00143) (.00170) (.00161) 
Off-balance sheet items/assets, t-
1 
   .02018*** .01792*** 
    (.00432) (.00386) 
Equity/assets, t-1    .00382 -.00645 
    (.00441) (.00445) 
Return on assets, t-1     .01012* 
     (.00397) 
Cost/income ratio, t-1     -.00535 
     (.01053) 
Constant .07538*** .06252*** .20321*** .20948*** .26425*** 
 (.00124) (.00253) (.01678) (.02262) (.05533) 
Model diagnostics      
No. of obs. 
 
4361 4361 4361 4361 4308 
R-squared 0.0860 0.0974 0.1382 0.1471 0.1518 
F 140.41*** 100.90*** 111.01*** 86.89*** 84.88*** 
Root MSE .0773 .07683 .0751 .07473 .07332 
Note. *, **, *** significant at the 5 %, 1 % and 0,1 % level, respectively. Clustered robust standard errors reported in the 
parentheses. 
 
The results capture a negative and statistically highly significant coefficient of household 
indebtedness. However, solely based on these results alone, it is difficult to estimate to what 
degree this effect is related to supply and to what degree to demand side of bank lending. For 
other macroeconomic factors, the lagged GDP growth rate intuitively presents a positive effect 
on loan growth. This result is consistent, for instance, with Aiyar et al. (2016), Meriläinen (2016) 
and Berrospide and Edge (2010). On the contrary, the three-month Euribor interest rate does 
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Table 4. Fixed effects estimations.  
 I II III IV V 
Consolidation .09460*** .09658*** .16903*** .16248*** .15968*** 
 (.01926) (.01899) (.02893) (.02966) (.02978) 
CRD IV -.05094*** -.0395*** .00128 .00290 -.00238 
 (.00308) (.00394) (.00513) (.00563) (.00605) 
GDP growth rate, t-1  .00190*** .00080* .00052 .00047 
  (.00034) (.00032) (.00033) (.00033) 
Interest rate, t-1  .00428*** -.00183 -.00066 -.00265* 
  (.00104) (.00115) (.00118) (.00130) 
Household indebtedness, t-1   .00096** .00070* .00072* 
   (.00034) (.00035) (.00036) 
Total assets, t-1   -.1954*** -.1836*** -.1732*** 
   (.02988) (.03016) (.02949) 
Off-balance sheet items/assets, t-
1 
   .02442*** .02208*** 
    (.00532) (.00488) 
Equity/assets, t-1    .02604 .01139 
    (.01384) (.01263) 
Return on assets, t-1     .00797* 
     (.00392) 
Cost/income ratio, t-1     -.00416 
     (.01043) 
Constant .07489*** .06183*** 2.1897*** 1.9816*** 1.9245*** 
 (.00137) (.00273) (.30497) (.31511) (.31501) 
Model diagnostics      
No. of obs. 
 
4361 4361 4361 4361 4308 
R-squared (overall) 0.0846 0.0959 0.0039 0.0052 0.0069 
F 140.28*** 95.65*** 88.72*** 67.99*** 65.16*** 
Note. *, **, *** significant at the 5 %, 1 % and 0,1 % level, respectively. Clustered robust standard errors reported in the 
parentheses. 
 
For the rest of bank-specific determinants, we confirm the findings by Bustamante et al. 
(2019) and Berrospide and Edge (2010) who find that more profitable banks tend to grant more 
credit. Meanwhile, the equity/assets ratio or the banks’ operational efficiency (cost/income ratio) 
do not exhibit any consistent effects. Interestingly, the off-balance sheet activity (items as a 
percentage of total assets) enters positive and statistically highly significant in both 
specifications. Since the variable is once-lagged, one possible explanation is that customers 
draw on their lines of credit, converting the previously unused commitments into on-balance 
sheet loans, thus increasing the value of outstanding loans at 𝑡 . However, this study 
unfortunately suffers from the lack of more detailed data on individual items within the total 
value of off-balance sheet exposures.  
Next, we estimate the baseline model with a panel fixed effects estimator, which sweeps out 
the bank-specific heterogeneity by subtracting the cross-sectional mean from each observation. 
Results are reported in Table 4. 




The regulation dummy variable CRD IV again suggests a negative effect on loan growth but 
does not remain statistically significant across the board. Interestingly, the household 
indebtedness flips the sign in fixed effects estimations. As concluded earlier, it is difficult to 
assess whether these findings, taken together, indicate an increase in demand or a decrease in 
supply since we should also expect banks to avoid granting more loans to already indebted 
customers. This severe problem with identifying causal impact between the internal and 
external balance sheet shocks and the corresponding change in credit supply is discussed in 
Peydro (2010) and Lambertini and Mukherjee (2016), who point out to the endogeneity bias 
between credit demand and credit supply.  
On the contrary, the dummy variable Consolidation, bank size, off-balance sheet activity or 
profitability do not flip signs across estimations. The captured coefficient for bank size is 
consistent with Fungáčová et al. (2014). Similarly, in Accornero et al. (2017), bank size enters 
negatively when bank fixed effects are included in the estimation. According to their 
interpretation, those banks that have grown “too big” are relatively less willing to extend new 
credit. On the other hand, Cambacorta (2005) concludes the effect of bank size to be irrelevant 
on loan supply.  
 
4.2. Survey 
A rather rich research body is devoted to the relationship between capital requirements and the 
supply and price of bank credit. Starting with credit supply, De Jonghey et al. (2016) provide 
evidence on higher capital requirements corresponding with lower credit supply to corporations. 
In a similar vein, Bridges et al. (2014) capture a relationship between increased capital 
requirements and a corresponding decrease in lending to private non-financial corporations. 
Aiyar et al. (2014) conclude that U.K. banks to reduce lending in response to tighter capital 
requirements (1 percentage point increase in capital requirements reduced credit growth by 6.5-
7.2 percentage points). Mesonnier and Monks (2015) estimate a 1 percentage point increase in 
Core Tier 1 ratio to be associated with a 1.2 percentage point reduction in credit growth. 
Similarly, the results by Noss and Toffano (2016) suggest a decrease in lending subsequent to 
an increase in aggregate bank capital requirement, but that the effect is larger in corporate 
lending vis-à-vis to the household lending.  
In consequence, the bank lending capacity is of particular concern in the case of small and 
medium-sized enterprises, as they are typically the main contributors for economic growth and 
employment (European Banking Authority, 2012). Although capital requirements do not have 
the objective to affect credit supply per se, the increased capital requirements may nevertheless 
have indirect effects on lending, should raising capital become (too) costly (De Jonghey et al., 
2016). In this vein, the survey first asked the respondents to assess whether their loan terms 
had tightened during the current decade. Secondly, respondents were asked to assess the 
magnitude of regulatory reform’s direct impact on their loan terms. The results are reported in  
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N Valid 7 6 5 7 6 6 6 5 4 6 5 5 
Missing 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 
Median 3 3 3 3 3 3 3,50 3 3,50 3 3 4 
Mode 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3a 3 3 4 
Range 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 3 1 1 
Minimum 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 
Maximum 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 
Note. a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown. At first, respondents were presented the following 
statement: “Our loan terms have tightened notably during the current decade in the following cases”. For the latter part, 
the statement was: “The direct impact of regulation on our loan terms has been notable in the following cases”. Answers 
were coded as 1 = “Strongly disagree”, 2 = “Disagree”, 3 = “Neutral”, 4 = “Agree”, 5 = “Strongly agree”. 
 
Table 5. Accordingly, in case of both SME and large enterprise lending, the respondents 
were collectively neutral to slightly at one with the stance according to which the renewed 
regulation has had a notable impact on their loan terms. Identical, consistent agreement is 
captured for both short- and long-term loans (last two items): 
Due to the potential endogeneity bias discussed earlier, the respondents were asked to 
assess the impact of different factors on the possible change in their credit supply for the past 
three years. The answers are rather diversified without any clear consistency. Hence, the 
previously voiced problems in regards to isolating the true regulatory effect are emphasized by 
the results reported in Table 6. 
Thirdly, the respondents were asked to estimate the impact of increased capital 
requirements on the price of credit in different lending scenarios. For instance, Kisin and Manela 
(2016) estimated a 0.3 basis points increase in lending rates subsequent to a 1 percentage 
point increase in capital requirements. King (2010) concluded a 1 percentage point increase in 
capital requirements and a corresponding 15 basis points increase in lending rates. Consistent 
results are found in Corbae and D'Erasmo (2014), De Resende et al. (2010) and Hanson et al. 
(2011), although the latter ones propose the effect to be relatively small. In a similar vein, the 
responses shown in Table 7 are somewhat indicative of the linkage between capital 
requirements and the price of borrowing, though in a lesser extent in the case of personal and 
household loans. 
 
Table 6. Impact of different factors on the possible change in credit supply. 
 Changes in demand side Capital requirements under the 
renewed regulation 
Changes in supply side 
N Valid 7 7 7 
Missing 0 0 0 
Median 3 3 3 
Mode 3a 3 2 
Range 4 3 3 
Minimum 1 2 2 
Maximum 5 5 5 
Note. a. Multiple modes exist. Respondents were asked if “in the last three years, our lending volume has been 
negatively affected by the following reasons”. Answers were coded as 1 = “Strongly disagree”, 2 = “Disagree”, 3 = 
“Neutral”, 4 = “Agree”, 5 = “Strongly agree”. 




Thirdly, the respondents were asked to estimate the impact of increased capital 
requirements on the price of credit in different lending scenarios. For instance, Kisin and Manela 
(2016) estimated a 0.3 basis points increase in lending rates subsequent to a 1 percentage 
point increase in capital requirements. King (2010) concluded a 1 percentage point increase in 
capital requirements and a corresponding 15 basis points increase in lending rates. Consistent 
results are found in Corbae and D'Erasmo (2014), De Resende et al. (2010) and Hanson et al. 
(2011), although the latter ones propose the effect to be relatively small. In a similar vein, the 
responses shown in Table 7 are somewhat indicative of the linkage between capital 
requirements and the price of borrowing, though in a lesser extent in the case of personal and 
household loans. 
The commencement of the CRD IV, as well as this survey, coincided with somewhat weak 
macroeconomic and financial market conditions in Finland and the EU. Hence, in a further 
attempt to isolate the impact of different factors on banks’ business environment, the 
respondents were asked to assess several influences from the perspective of their profitability. 
As reflected by Table 8, the respondents were particularly consistent regarding the negative 
impact of the low interest rate environment. Interestingly, in the case of loan supply, the earlier 
econometric findings suggested that the effect of the three-month Euribor rate was somewhat 
nonexistent. 
Table 7. The impact of renewed regulation on the price of credit in different lending scenarios.  





Short-term loans Long-term loans 
N Valid 6 6 7 6 6 
Missing 1 1 0 1 1 
Median 4 4 4 4 4 
Mode 4 4 4 4 4 
Range 2 2 3 2 2 
Minimum 3 3 2 3 3 
Maximum 5 5 5 5 5 
Note. Respondents were presented with a claim according to which “capital requirements have increased the cost of 
borrowing in the following cases”. 1 = “Strongly disagree”, 2 = “Disagree”, 3 = “Neutral”, 4 = “Agree”, 5 = “Strongly 
agree”. 




























N Valid 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Median 4 3,50 3 3,50 2 3 2 
Mode 4 2a 3 3a 2 3 2 
Range 3 3 2 5 2 2 1 
Minimum 2 2 2 0 1 2 1 
Maximum 5 5 4 5 3 4 2 
Note. a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown. Respondents were asked to assess the impact each 
specified factor has had on the bank’s profitability in the current decade. Answers were coded as 1 = “Highly 
negatively”, 2 = “Somewhat negatively”, 3 = “Neutral”, 4 = “Somewhat positively”, 5 = “Highly positively”. 




This study contributed to the literature on bank capital requirements in two ways. After 
controlling for several bank-specific and macroeconomic factors with panel data, the key result 
indicated a slightly negative relationship between increased capital requirements (proxied by the 
CRD IV regulation dummy variable) and the Finnish unlisted savings and cooperative banks’ 
credit supply. The study also captured consistent results in regards to the positive impact of 
both GDP growth and bank profitability on credit supply as well as somewhat consistent results 
in regards to the negative relationship between bank size and loan growth. In addition, the 
findings suggested that an increase in off-balance sheet items corresponds to an increase in 
credit supply. According to one possible explanation, the customers draw on their lines of credit, 
which converts the previously unused commitments into on-balance sheet loans in the 
subsequent period.  
Secondly, this study conducted a representative survey with personnel of the Finnish 
institutions. The results suggested that the renewed EU banking regulation has had a slight 
direct impact on banks’ corporate loan terms (for both SMEs and large enterprises), which was 
used as a proxy for credit supply. Further, the respondents were collectively neutral to slightly at 
one with a claim according to which the increased capital requirements have increased the price 
of credit for SMEs and large enterprises. However, direct conclusions are avoided in this 
regards. The survey, in particular, suffered from certain and in some cases, quite severe 
limitations. On the other hand, the survey also revealed other factors that have affected the 
banking business as a whole and lending in particular. 
Clearly, neither these nor prior findings implicate a regulatory failure. As noted earlier, the 
direct objective of the capital rules is not to influence the supply or the price of credit per se. 
Rather, the current regulatory ambition is to increase systemic stability and address those 
shortcomings that led to the 2008 meltdown. Nevertheless, the regulation still has an important 
role in capital and risk decisions (Tanda, 2015). Since banks react to external shocks by 
adjusting their business models, the policy analysis should always focus on second-order (and 
potentially counterproductive) effects. While some evidence suggests that higher capital 
requirements reduce excessive risk-taking (Repullo, 2004) and that higher capital requirements 
correspond with a more resilient banking sector (Basten and Koch, 2015), the truly relevant 
question is whether regulation generates unintentional incentives to raise overall risk exposure 
(Adrian et al., 2015; Adrian and Shin, 2014; Blum, 1999), or incentives to shift towards shadow 
banking or off-balance sheet activities (Goodhart, 2008; Martin and Parigi, 2013; Plantin, 2015) 
or incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage, that is, exporting the risk-taking to countries 
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